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1.  Introduction and background 
Last year the Reserve Bank concluded a review of its foreign exchange intervention policy. In 
March 2004, the Government approved a Reserve Bank proposal that gives the Bank the financial 
capacity to use foreign exchange intervention in order to inﬂuence the level of the exchange rate. This 
new approach allows for intervention at the extremes of the exchange rate cycle, directed at leaning 
against trends in the exchange rate which the Bank assesses to be unjustiﬁed by economic 
fundamentals.  
The new policy is in addition to the Bank’s usual foreign exchange (FX) intervention objectives. Since 
the exchange rate was ﬂoated in 1985, the Reserve Bank’s policy has been to use intervention only in 
times of “extreme market disorder”. The focus of existing policy is on preserving the functioning of the 
foreign exchange market in a crisis, rather than preserving any given level of the exchange rate 
per se.
1 This crisis management policy is for those very rare occasions when the foreign exchange 
market itself breaks down, transactions are unable to be completed, and where as a result the stability 
of the wider ﬁnancial and economic system is threatened. Thankfully, in the 20 years since the 
New Zealand dollar was ﬂoated the Reserve Bank has not needed to intervene to forestall such a 
crisis.   
The new policy provides the Bank with another monetary policy tool - in addition to the Ofﬁcial Cash 
Rate (OCR). The Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) between the Governor and the Minister of Finance 
requires the Bank to maintain price stability whilst avoiding unnecessary volatility in output, interest 
rates, and the exchange rate. This new tool is designed to help trim those peaks and troughs of the 
exchange rate cycle that make the task of achieving price stability while minimising unnecessary 
volatility difficult. Usually the Bank will use the OCR to implement monetary policy, but sometimes 
(probably rarely) intervention may assist the Bank to achieve its PTA obligations. 
The Bank will implement its new intervention policy independently of the Government, in the same way 
it sets the OCR. Intervention will only be used at times when it is most likely to be effective and when 
intervention is consistent with the PTA. The Bank has developed criteria to help judge when it is most 
appropriate to use intervention. These criteria have been publicly disclosed and agreed with the 
Minister of Finance, consistent with the Bank’s generally transparent approach to the formulation of 
monetary policy. If intervention occurs, it will be transparently communicated to the public after the 
fact, allowing stakeholders to hold the Bank accountable for its actions. 
Underpinning the new intervention policy are adequate ﬁnancial resources which ensure the Bank’s 
ability to implement its strategy independently of the Government, while maintaining its credibility with 
markets and the public. 
This paper lays out the framework for the new policy. Section 2 summarises the broad objectives and 
strategy of the new policy. This is followed in section 3 by a discussion on the criteria the Bank will use 
to assess the merits of intervention in any given circumstance. In section 4 the implications of the new 
policy for the Reserve Bank’s balance sheet are highlighted. The ﬁnal section describes how 
intervention will be implemented, and how the intervention policy will be communicated to markets, the 
public and the Government. 
                                                       
1   As part of its ongoing legal commitment to advise the Minister of Finance on exchange rate matters, the Reserve Bank is 
also increasing the level of reserves it holds for crisis management or “insurance” purposes. For a discussion of the Bank’s 
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2.   Intervention objectives and strategy  
What is FX intervention? 
In our terminology, foreign exchange intervention is the purchase or sale by the Reserve Bank of 
New  Zealand dollars in exchange for foreign currencies in the foreign exchange market, with the 
objective of inﬂuencing the level of the exchange rate. This is distinct from merely transacting in the FX 
market to manage normal foreign exchange requirements as such transactions are done with the aim 
of minimising any impact on the exchange rate.
2 
Objectives of the new policy 
The new intervention policy is aimed speciﬁcally at trimming the peaks and troughs of medium-term 
ﬂuctuations in the New Zealand dollar (NZD) exchange rate, where there is a misalignment between 
the exchange rate and the value associated with its “fundamental” macroeconomic determinants.  
In terms of macroeconomic fundamentals, the value of the exchange rate over the medium to long run 
is determined by, among other things, relative inﬂation and interest rate differentials, the stage in the 
business cycle in relation to its trading partners, movements in the terms of trade, and productivity 
differentials.
3 These relationships mean that the exchange rate can act as a signiﬁcant buffer for the 
economy. When the New Zealand economy is weak, for example, proﬁtability and asset returns tend 
to be low, reducing demand for New Zealand dollar denominated assets. This, in turn, is likely to lead 
to a depreciation of the exchange rate, helping to promote a return to stronger activity, while 
encouraging the efﬁcient allocation of productive resources. 
But there may be times when exchange rate ﬂuctuations do not fully reﬂect fundamentals. Examples 
might include instances where the short-run value of the exchange rate over- or under-shoots its 
fundamentally-determined or “fair” value because of non-fundamental factors such as the 
trend-following behaviour implied by some technical trading rules followed by foreign exchange 
dealers, or other short-term speculative behaviour. 
Non-fundamental drivers may at times push the exchange rate to extreme levels, putting undue 
pressure on some parts of the economy, such as the export sector, and leading to an inefficient 
allocation of resources. Firms adversely affected may refrain from investing or expanding their 
operations in such a climate, some may go out of business altogether, while others 
beneficially-affected might be induced to make ultimately unsound investments.
4 
Instances where there is a signiﬁcant misalignment between the exchange rate and its fundamental 
value are probably few and far between. Further, it can be hard to identify exchange rate 
misalignments. Consequently, it is likely that we will intervene relatively rarely to inﬂuence the level of 
the exchange rate.  
Basic strategy 
Figure 1 presents a stylised picture of the basic strategy. When the New Zealand dollar is too high (in 
terms of the benchmark criteria explained in section 3), the Reserve Bank will sell New Zealand dollars 
and buy foreign currency in the foreign exchange market. Conversely, when the currency is too low, 
the Reserve Bank will buy New Zealand dollars and sell foreign exchange. 
                                                       
2   Some examples of standard FX transactions include those associated with the payment of bills denominated in foreign 
currencies or transactions to help manage the Bank’s exposure to exchange rate risk. 
3   For a discussion of some of these factors, see Munro (2004). 
4   Such developments raise the possibility of  “hysteresis” effects, whereby  the growth of ﬁrms during low exchange periods is 
not sufficient to offset declining numbers in high periods. In turn, the overall result could be slower growth of the export or 
tradables sector than might otherwise be the case. BIS Papers No 24  233
 
Figure 1 
Illustrative intervention scenario 
 
 
Intervention near the peaks of the exchange rate cycle will leave the Bank with an open (unhedged) 
net “long” foreign currency position, while intervention at troughs will result in an open net “short” 
foreign currency position.
5 Open foreign currency positions will be closed when the exchange rate 
nears the middle of the normal cyclical range - that is, when the exchange rate is near its long term 
equilibrium value. For example, if the Bank had a net long foreign currency position, it would look to 
buy back New Zealand dollars at that point. 
How intervention works 
Intervention is thought to work best in situations where it provides a signal to markets about future 
monetary policy settings or the level of the equilibrium exchange rate. The signal might relate to 
information the central bank has but market participants do not. The act of intervention may convey a 
message about monetary policy settings or the exchange rate that gives market participants greater 




                                                       
5    The Reserve Bank’s neutral net foreign exchange position is zero, whereby foreign currency reserve assets held for 
“insurance” purposes are fully hedged by foreign currency liabilities. Consequently, intervention would involve a net “long” or 
“short” foreign currency position being established.  
6   For a discussion of the relevant literature see Sarno and Taylor (2001). 
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Another reason why intervention might have an impact on the exchange rate in some cases is the idea 
that exchange rates are partly determined by the underlying structure of the ﬁnancial markets.
7 For 
example, simple technical trading rules that try to take advantage of the continuation of short term 
trends in ﬁnancial prices are used widely in the markets.
8
  If exchange rates are at times partially 
determined by trend-following behaviour not related to macroeconomic fundamentals, then it is 
possible intervention could have an impact on exchange rates if intervention disrupts the signals that 
trend followers look for. A relatively modest transaction by the central bank at the right time may be 
sufficient to slow or even prevent further movements of the exchange rate away from equilibrium. It 
might also be the case that intervention could encourage short term traders to jump in behind the 
Bank, reinforcing the efficacy of the initial intervention. 
However, all of these mechanisms are subtle drivers of markets. We do not expect that intervention 
will be effective enough to offset the impact of macroeconomic fundamentals. This view is consistent 
with the experience of other central banks who have tried to intervene against fundamental trends and 
have been unsuccessful. 
3.   Criteria for assessing the appropriateness of intervention 
The previous section brieﬂy discussed how the new intervention policy would work, with the goal of 
trimming the peaks and troughs of extreme medium term movements in the exchange rate. 
To successfully implement foreign exchange intervention the Bank has developed a framework and 
criteria to guide decision making on when to intervene. This will help to ensure that the Bank 
implements intervention in line with its stated objectives, and that any ﬁnancial and reputational risks 
of intervention are managed in a prudent fashion. 
Speciﬁcally, before intervening the Bank will need to be satisﬁed that all of the following criteria are 
met: 
•  the exchange rate must be exceptionally high or low; 
•  the exchange rate must be unjustiﬁed by economic fundamentals; 
•  intervention must be consistent with the PTA; and 
•  conditions in markets must be opportune, allowing intervention a reasonable chance of 
success. 
When is the exchange rate exceptionally high or low? 
Since the ﬂoat of the New Zealand dollar in 1985, the nominal trade weighted index (TWI) has 
ﬂuctuated in a wide range around a fairly stable long-run average (see Figure 2).
9
 
Assessing when the exchange rate is exceptionally high or low is largely a statistical exercise. The 
current level of the exchange rate would be compared with historical deviations from its long-run 
average, to identify situations when the deviations are unusually large. This criterion probably involves 
the least amount of judgement in comparison to the others. 
The main focus is on the “effective” exchange rate or TWI, as this best represents a measure of the 
exchange rate relevant for the whole economy on average. However, individual exchange rates would 
also be examined as a cross-check to see whether the broad measure is being unduly driven by 
factors speciﬁc to particular currencies.  
                                                       
7   Sarno and Taylor (2001) provide a light overview while Evans and Lyons (2002) provide a more in depth examination. 
8   See Cheung and Chinn (2001) for a survey of the practices of market participants. 
9    The TWI comprises the currencies of Australia, the Euro zone, Japan, the US and UK, weighted according to each 
currency’s share of New Zealand’s merchandise trade and their share of the 5-country aggregate GDP. BIS Papers No 24  235
 
Figure 2 























When is an exchange rate unjustiﬁed by fundamentals? 
Although the ﬁrst requirement for intervention might be satisﬁed - the exchange rate could be 
exceptional by historical standards - it does not automatically follow that the level is unjustiﬁed.  
In reaching a judgement as to whether the exchange rate might be unjustiﬁed, the Bank will look for 
evidence of a disjuncture between the value of the exchange rate and the cyclical position of the 
economy and other fundamental factors underpinning medium-term trend movements in the exchange 
rate.  
Any assessment of whether a given exchange rate is unjustiﬁed requires a judgement of where the 
currency should be relative to where it actually is, based on particular information on the direction of 
economic fundamentals. This judgement involves bringing together information from a number of 
sources. This information set includes, among other things: 
The cyclical position of the economy relative to trading partners. The exchange rate should depreciate 
if New Zealand’s expected relative growth rate slows. Speciﬁc factors include indicators relating to 
domestic consumption, net migration, the housing market, and relative output gaps. Relative cyclical 
positions are also often reﬂected in interest rate differentials, especially given that most TWI partner 
countries target low inﬂation. For example, a softer economy implies lower New Zealand interest rates, 
and hence lower interest rate differentials with trading partners.  
The terms of trade. An increase in the terms of trade indicates that the real purchasing power of 
exports has increased, which tends to be associated with a strengthening of the New Zealand dollar. 
The current account position. The current account is a broad indicator of both external and internal 
balances which are relevant to the question of whether the exchange rate is justiﬁed. For example, an 
unusually large current account deﬁcit in New Zealand might suggest that the exchange rate is 
overvalued and that a downward correction in the New Zealand dollar is warranted to bring about 
external balance.  
Other evidence about the general condition of the tradables sector of the economy. For example, 
indicators of signiﬁcant and unusual levels of activity or proﬁtability within the export sector could 
provide corroborative evidence that a particular level of the exchange rate was unjustiﬁed. 236  BIS Papers No 24
 
These indicators are not intended to provide a ﬁxed checklist relevant for all situations. An all 
encompassing set of indicators suitable for deciding whether the exchange rate in every situation is 
unjustiﬁed does not exist. Nor is there an economic model of the exchange rate that reliably integrates 
all this information into a form that indicates degrees of disjuncture or disequilibrium. The economic 
relationships alluded to in the foregoing discussion are not fully understood, precisely identified, or 
static. Nonetheless the focus of intervention policy and this criterion in particular is on significant 
degrees of disjuncture, in a medium-term context, where the economic relationships remain relevant 
and precision is much less of an issue. Thus in applying this criterion the Bank cannot and should not 
take a mechanistic approach to deciding whether intervention is warranted. Each potential intervention 
will be assessed on a case by case basis using information that seems most appropriate to the 
situation at hand. 
Intervention consistent with the PTA 
The third criterion that must be satisfied before intervention is considered is that intervention must not 
conﬂict with the PTA. The PTA states that the Bank must aim for inﬂation outcomes between 1-3% 
over the medium term, while avoiding unnecessary instability in output, interest rates, and the 
exchange rate. 
At one level, the new intervention policy can help contribute directly to avoiding unnecessary instability 
in the exchange rate if intervention helps offset a misalignment of the exchange rate from economic 
fundamentals. 
But intervention must not compromise the overriding objective of price stability. In other words, the 
Reserve Bank will need to be comfortable that any inﬂationary or disinﬂationary impact from 
intervention will not push inﬂation outside the target range over the medium term.
10 For example, 
intervention to dampen an upward exchange rate cycle implies less exchange rate restraint on inﬂation 
pressures, all else being equal. Hence the Bank will also have to be conﬁdent that undesirable future 
interest rate increases will not be necessary to compensate for a successful foreign exchange 
intervention. 
An implication of the PTA consistency criterion is that intervention should be timed to roughly coincide 
with the broad thrust of interest rate settings. For example, it makes little sense to intervene to try and 
push the exchange rate lower when the Bank believes that higher interest rates may be required in the 
near future to control inﬂation pressures. In this situation, a successful intervention would 
inappropriately loosen monetary conditions. Normally, the Bank would look to adjust its main policy 
lever - the OCR - when overall monetary conditions seem too tight or easy. However, there might be 
occasions when the Bank is reluctant to move the OCR. For example, the Bank might conclude that 
further interest rate tightening to offset domestic inﬂation pressures is inappropriate, but that it is too 
soon to begin actually cutting interest rates. The Bank could intervene in response to an overvalued 
exchange rate that is extreme and unjustiﬁed, thereby effectively loosening monetary conditions 
without prematurely beginning an interest rate easing cycle. 
Intervention must be opportune 
Even if intervention is warranted from a policy standpoint (ie, intervention satisﬁes the ﬁrst three 
criteria), conditions in the foreign exchange markets must be conducive to having a meaningful impact 
on the exchange rate. It would be pointless, and potentially costly, to intervene in circumstances where 
there was little chance of affecting prevailing market trends. At the extreme, speculators could be 
encouraged to trade against the Bank in the foreign exchange market, thereby exaggerating exchange 
rate mis-alignment. 
Intervention is more likely to be opportune and thus effective when most of the following apply: 
•  there is a relative absence of capital ﬂows that might offset intervention; 
                                                       
10   A depreciating exchange rate makes imports of consumer goods and inputs more expensive in New Zealand dollar terms 
and so adds to inflation pressure. Conversely, an appreciating currency constrains inflation pressure by reducing the cost of 
imports in New Zealand dollar terms. BIS Papers No 24  237
 
•  market participants are becoming less sure that the exchange rate will remain signiﬁcantly 
above or below fair value; 
•  market participants are becoming less conﬁdent that recent trends in the exchange rate that 
have taken the exchange rate further away from fair value will persist; 
•  the balance of capital ﬂows is shifting towards pushing the exchange rate back towards 
equilibrium, and there is some prospect that capital ﬂows in the future will bias the exchange 
rate to move in a similar direction to that implied by intervention; and 
•  market participants are positioned in such a way that they are vulnerable to a sudden 
movement in the exchange rate towards fair value - so that should such a movement occur, 
they would need to transact to reduce their exposures, with such transactions supporting the 
direction of intervention.  
The Bank is a regular participant in the foreign exchange market and maintains an extensive array of 
contacts from whom information can be gleaned to assist in making judgements on whether the above 
considerations are satisﬁed, and thus whether intervention is opportune. 
Taken together, the four criteria provide a robust framework for assessing when to intervene. If the 
exchange rate is exceptionally and unjustiﬁably high, and it is opportune to intervene, then it is most 
likely that intervention will be effective in trimming the peaks and troughs of the exchange rate cycle. It 
is also more likely that the ﬁnancial and reputational risks associated with intervention will be 
minimised as much as possible. Reputational risks are managed because the criteria minimise the 
chance that intervention will conﬂict with monetary policy. Financial risks are managed as the criteria 
reduce the chance of the Bank running down its capital. And both reputational and financial standing 
are supported by criteria that rule out attempts to defend a particular level of the exchange rate, and 
that reduce the prospect of intervention against fundamentally determined trends in the exchange rate.  
4.   Financial implications for the Bank 
This section describes the implications that intervention would have on the Reserve Bank’s annual net 
income and on the structure of the balance sheet. 
The impact of intervention on the Bank’s proﬁtability and capital requirements 
Intervention would add signiﬁcant volatility to the Bank’s earnings. This volatility mainly reﬂects the 
nature of a ﬂoating currency and thus the exchange rate risk inherent in net open foreign positions 
accumulated through intervention. 
Corporations hold capital partly to see them through the times when the company is less proﬁtable 
than average. The Reserve Bank is no different in this respect. The Bank holds capital in the form of 
investments in New Zealand government securities that can be liquidated to cover losses incurred 
while conducting normal business activities. 
As intervention implies a higher level of ﬁnancial risk compared to the Reserve Bank’s other activities, 
the Bank needed additional capital to cover the potential for losses associated with intervention. 
The Bank estimated the amount of capital required to be NZ$ one billion, given the strategy it wished 
to implement and a conservative view of the peak losses that might stem from the strategy. The 
Bank’s request for a capital injection from the Government, to give it the ﬁnancial capability to 
implement intervention independently of the Government, was one of the key recommendations the 
Bank made to the Minister of Finance early in 2004. The Minister of Finance and Cabinet endorsed the 
Bank’s request for additional capital and that capital was delivered to the Bank in June 2004.  
The following two sections describe in more detail the nature of the factors that give rise to the 
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The impact of exchange rate changes 
The criteria used to decide when to intervene can mitigate but not entirely eliminate exchange rate 
risk. Losses from net open intervention positions could accrue for a while. However, these are likely to 
be temporary or “unrealised” losses, as in the end, unrealised losses will disappear, provided the 
exchange rate reverts back to its long run average i.e. to at least the level at which the intervention 
took place. 
A more serious situation is one where the Bank might not identify a change in the equilibrium 
exchange rate and intervenes inappropriately in terms of its criteria. In this case losses could well 
become “realised”, or appear permanently on the Bank’s balance sheet. However, the appropriate 
application of the intervention criteria will help minimise the potential for permanent realised exchange 
rate losses being incurred. This is because the criteria limit intervention to cases of extreme departure 
of the exchange rate from its long-run average, thereby requiring an extreme change in the long-run 
average to negate the basic strategy of buying low and selling high. Such a strategy should thus prove 
proﬁtable in terms of realised exchange rate gains over the medium term for the Bank’s balance sheet. 
The impact of interest rates 
Intervention results in the Bank investing and borrowing in different currencies at potentially quite 
different interest rates from normal, making the average carrying cost of holding reserves more 
variable and perhaps larger. 
New Zealand interest rates tend to be higher than those in the countries where the Bank invests 
reserves (currently the US and Europe). This means that when the Bank intervenes to lean against a 
high exchange rate - and accordingly when it borrows New Zealand dollars to invest offshore - the 
average carrying cost of holding reserves would rise.
11   
At the other end of the exchange rate cycle the opposite would occur. The Bank would earn extra 
income by borrowing at relatively low foreign interest rates and investing at higher New Zealand rates. 
Over the entire exchange rate cycle, the periods when the Bank’s carrying cost of holding reserves is 
higher than usual should be broadly balanced by periods when the reserves carrying cost is lower. 
However, it is probably the case that interest rate differentials will be a bit higher on average at the top 
of the exchange rate cycle than when the exchange rate is relatively low. Hence on average it is quite 
likely that intervention will add a modest amount to the average carrying cost of holding reserves. 
These higher average carrying costs should be balanced by the potential for realised gains on the 
exchange rate described earlier, implying that intervention overall should not prove costly over the 
medium term, and may prove to be proﬁtable.  
The impact of intervention on the level of foreign reserves 
Foreign exchange intervention requires the Bank to take on an exchange rate exposure to try to 
inﬂuence the exchange rate. Intervention at the top of the exchange rate cycle will result in an 
increase in the Bank’s foreign currency reserves, unless the change in exchange rate exposure is 
achieved by changing the currency denomination of the foreign currency loans the Bank already has 
(by using derivatives, or by repaying existing loans early and replacing them with New Zealand dollar 
denominated loans). 
Intervention at the bottom of the exchange rate cycle could hypothetically result in the Bank running its 
foreign reserves down to the point where it had insufficient reserves to adequately deal with market 
dysfunction in a crisis. In practice this will not occur, as the Minister of Finance has instructed the Bank 
to ensure that in conducting intervention the Bank maintain a stock of foreign currency investments of 
                                                       
11   Sterilisation of the domestic monetary effect of intervention is automatic in New Zealand, as daily liquidity management 
operations aim at maintaining a given amount of settlement cash, with standing facilities bounding the overnight interest rate 
within 25 basis points of the OCR target. The net effect of these arrangements is that the New Zealand dollars borrowed to 
finance acquisition of US dollars in the intervention are effectively borrowed at market interest rates in the daily open market 
operations. BIS Papers No 24  239
 
at least SDR 2.45b (currently around NZD 5.1b). This means that the Bank will have to borrow in 
foreign currencies to ﬁnance intervention at the bottom of the exchange rate cycle. 
Because the Bank’s neutral position involves no net foreign currency exposure, intervention at the 
bottom of the exchange rate cycle thus implies that the Bank’s foreign currency denominated liabilities 
would exceed its assets. Whilst this means that the Bank will have negative net foreign reserves in 
aggregate, its crisis intervention capacity will not be signiﬁcantly impaired as it ensures that no more 
than 20 per cent of its foreign currency loans come due in any year. The foreign currency loans used 
to ﬁnance intervention would also be medium term, leaving the Bank’s short-term crisis management 
capacity intact. 
Intervention at the bottom of the exchange rate cycle can also be ﬁnanced with FX swaps. As long as 
the swaps are of a medium-term maturity then the Bank’s crisis intervention capability will not be 
substantively affected by intervention. 
5.   How will intervention be implemented? 
Institutional framework 
The Bank conducts its crisis management intervention policy in cases of extreme foreign exchange 
market disorder as an agent of the Minister of Finance. Under section 17 of the Reserve Bank Act, the 
Minister can instruct the Bank to deal in the foreign exchange markets on the Government’s behalf. 
This means that, while the Bank advises the Minister on crisis intervention, and would implement 
intervention for crisis management, the actual decision on whether to intervene and the ﬁnancial 
implications of that intervention rest with the Minister and the government’s account respectively. 
The new monetary policy related intervention role is set up differently. Foreign exchange intervention 
in support of the PTA has been organised to give the Bank full operational independence from the 
Minister and the Government, in the same way the Bank has independence to formulate and 
implement monetary policy. This operational independence for FX intervention is provided for in 
section 16 of the Reserve Bank Act. The implication of this greater independence is that the Governor 
and the Bank accept the full ﬁnancial implications of intervention - proﬁts and losses accrue to the 
Bank and impact on the Bank’s balance sheet. 
The reason why FX intervention for monetary policy purposes has been set up differently from crisis 
intervention reﬂects an effort to manage some of the related risks. In particular, foreign exchange 
market intervention has the potential to conflict with monetary policy. Because the Bank has control of 
intervention decisions, it is able to manage conflicts between intervention policy and monetary policy 
objectives such that the single price stability objective in the Reserve Bank Act is not undermined. In 
addition, as the Bank has sole responsibility for the timing of intervention and the subsequent squaring 
out of intervention positions, there is little scope for the Bank to be forced to abandon its strategy early 
under pressure from the Government. This would help to manage some of the ﬁnancial risks inherent 
in intervening at cyclical extremes, as it gives the Bank the ability to hold positions for the time that will 
generally be required to exit at a proﬁt (once the exchange rate reverts to more average levels). 
Transactions 
Intervention will usually be conducted in the New Zealand dollar/US dollar currency pair. This is 
because market participants quote this currency pair the most actively and most other currency pairs 
are derived with reference to the NZD/USD exchange rate.
12 Using this currency pair allows the Bank 
to conduct its intervention in the quickest and most efﬁcient manner, maximising the impact on the 
New Zealand dollar exchange rate against all other currencies. 
                                                       
12   For example, a market quote in the NZD/JPY would normally be calculated as the product of the NZD/USD and USD/JPY 
exchange rates - both of which are individually and actively quoted. 240  BIS Papers No 24
 
The Bank intends to be ﬂexible in its implementation style and will not adopt any ﬁxed method of 
implementation. However, transactions will generally be with wholesale market participants, and would 
typically be of a size similar to the standard market parcel (NZD 10 million) or larger. To maximise the 
strength of the intervention signal the Bank is likely to transact with a number of market makers 
simultaneously. The Bank will not transact directly with corporates or individual exporters or importers. 
The style of intervention is key to the effectiveness of intervention. Normally, market participants 
(including the Reserve Bank) try to conduct FX transactions in a manner that will minimise the impact 
of the transaction on the exchange rate. This is usually optimal, as to do otherwise results in higher 
transaction costs. The execution approach in intervention situations will be quite the opposite, as the 
aim of the operation would be to maximise the exchange rate impact. This implies that the Bank would 
look to intervene at times when there is relatively little interest by other market participants to trade 
against it. Also the style of execution will be relatively aggressive - the Bank will ask market 
participants to quote it a price and would deal on those prices, thereby forcing transactions into the 
market. This approach is more likely to result in the Bank’s counterparties quickly acting to pass on the 
Bank’s deals to others, creating ongoing transaction activity in the direction the Bank desires, 
maximising the impact on the exchange rate. The intervention execution approach stands in contrast 
to the Bank’s normal approach of easing transactions into the market with the aim of having no impact 
on the exchange rate. 
Generally, intervention will be quite open and will involve as many market makers as possible, to 
maximise the signalling impact of intervention. On occasion, though, it may be the case that 
intervention is covert, involving only one or two market makers, if it seems that this is more likely to 
lead to a greater chance of success. 
The Bank’s open foreign exchange position will be closed once the exchange rate returns to near its 
long-term average value. The associated transactions will be performed in a manner consistent with 
minimising the impact on the exchange rate. For example, the Bank will pick times when there are a 
number of other investors interested in trading in the opposite direction, and its execution style will be 
very passive. Such transactions have quite a different character to intervention, reﬂecting their quite 
different objectives.  
Communications 
The Reserve Bank adopts a very transparent approach to communicating its policies and operations in 
general. This will also apply to its approach to foreign exchange intervention. 
Often, intervention will be very open and public. In these cases the Bank will issue a press release 
shortly after having intervened, noting it has intervened and the rationale for the intervention. 
Sometimes, though, the Bank may wish to intervene covertly, which will mean that there will be no 
comment from the Bank at the time of intervention. The policy regarding commentary is that the Bank 
will comment on intervention if it thinks such commentary is useful in enhancing the effectiveness of 
the operation. Otherwise it will not make on-the-record comments to anyone in response to questions 
regarding intervention. 
Regardless of whether intervention is open or covert, intervention will be apparent after the fact. Each 
month the Bank and the Crown publish data on the status of the Bank’s balance sheet and the foreign 
exchange transactions the Bank has made with the markets. This information will clearly indicate when 
intervention has occurred within a month or two of its occurrence. 
Finally, the Bank’s Monetary Policy Statements, testimony to Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure 
Committee, and the Bank’s Annual Report will all contain commentary describing the Bank’s 
intervention activities, their rationale, and their impact on the Bank’s balance sheet. All of these 
communication media are important in ensuring that the Bank is accountable for any intervention 
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6.   Summary 
This article has provided an elaboration on the Reserve Bank’s new foreign exchange intervention 
policy. The new policy adds another instrument to the monetary policy toolkit, one speciﬁcally 
designed to trim only those peaks and troughs of the exchange rate cycle that are viewed as 
exceptional and unjustiﬁed by economic fundamentals.  
The Bank has full operational independence to conduct intervention, but any decision to intervene 
must be consistent with the Bank’s primary objective of price stability laid out in both the Reserve Bank 
Act and the PTA.  
The conditions attached to intervention manage ﬁnancial and reputational risks the Bank may face when 
intervening. This prudent approach to intervention is further reinforced by both the NZD one  billion 
of capital reserves added to the Reserve Bank’s balance sheet, and the transparency attached to the 
intervention regime as a whole. 
The degree of judgement required to undertake intervention, and the management of risks associated 
with any actual intervention, present an on-going challenge for the Bank to develop and maintain an 
appropriate level of operational capability. This capability involves ensuring that the Bank’s monitoring 
and forecasting of economic data is of a high standard, and that there exists a level of technical 
expertise (and relationship management) to carry out intervention in the foreign exchange market.  
As with any other facet of monetary policy, the performance of the Governor of the Reserve Bank in 
carrying out any intervention decisions would be subject to speciﬁc accountability arrangements. 
These include monitoring by the Bank’s Board, the Finance and Expenditure Committee, and the 
Minister of Finance, together with the general scrutiny provided by market participants and the public 
at large. 
The Bank does not envisage that intervention will be used frequently, as by and large its view is that 
New Zealand’s ﬂoating exchange rate does a good job of buffering the economy from external shocks. 
The new policy gives the Bank the capability to consider intervention in those rare instances when it is 
appropriate and useful. The new policy will not be a panacea for the large swings in the value of the 
New Zealand dollar that are a fact of life for a ﬂoating exchange rate. At best, intervention offers a mild 
palliative, and the bulk of exchange rate risk management will continue to sit with ﬁrms and individuals 
within New Zealand. 
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